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Abstract 
The report provides a quantitative analysis of the economic impacts of national public support to ICT R&D in the European 
Union, considering a number of policy scenarios covering different amounts of public spending, policy instruments and 
sources of financing. For this purpose we use a macroeconomic model with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth. The 
model accommodates a range of policy instruments that may be used to stimulate R&D activity (ICT or non-ICT) in the 
economy, and it captures multiple channels through which R&D activity affects the economy. 
The policy scenarios are simulated with the model. The simulation exercise provides some preliminary evidence that an 
increase in public expenditure to support ICT R&D might have a significantly positive impact on ICT sector BERD and on 
economic growth and employment in the EU. It also shows that the strength of this impact can be influenced by policy 
instruments and financing source. Additional work is needed to gain further insights into the sensitivity of these results to 
the assumptions and parameter settings used in the model. 
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Executive Summary 
The EU's Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) is one of the seven flagship initiatives under the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The DAE aims to help Europe's citizens 
and businesses to get the most out of digital technologies and to stimulate the economy. One of its 
targets in this respect is that EU Member States double their annual public spending on ICT R&D by 
2020 in real terms with respect to the 2007 level.  
This report examines how public spending on ICT R&D may affect private R&D spending and the 
economy, considering a number of policy scenarios covering different amounts of spending, policy 
instruments and sources of financing. The policy scenarios were selected by IPTS1 together with DG 
CNECT as the most relevant to explore. To examine the effect of public ICT R&D spending, a 
macroeconomic model2 with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth was developed and used.   
The main observations emerging from the analysis are the following: 
 Preliminary evidence from the simulations performed confirms that additional public 
expenditure to support ICT R&D may have positive effects on business R&D expenditure in the 
ICT sector and also on GDP and employment. In the most favourable case, each additional euro 
spend on public support to ICT R&D would raise ICT sector BERD in the long term (2040) by as 
much as 1.6 euros, and raise GDP by 2.8 euro. EU employment in the long term would increase 
by about 150 thousand full-time equivalent persons, mostly in high-skilled jobs. A J-shaped 
response of net exports and overall competitiveness is also envisaged, with long-term gains in 
productivity. 
 The simulations consider cases of full and partial achievements of the DEA spending target. 
Results suggest that marginal returns to public spending only slightly diminish for the 
expenditure levels considered (i.e. a partial achievement of the spending targets is associated 
with a marginal impact per euro just above that of full achievement). This indicates that there 
are still substantial gains to be made from reaching the spending target, even from a position 
of partial achievement. The simulation results also suggest that the level of expenditures 
chosen by Member States affects not only domestic growth and employment, but also the 
economy in other Member States. However, this cross-border effect is found to be small. For 
example, if Germany fully achieves the DEA spending target rather than reaching 75% of it, 
this would only marginally affect GDP and employment in the other EU Member States. 
Likewise the effects on German GDP and employment from changes in expenditure levels by 
other EU Member States are found to be small.  
 The choice of the policy instrument affects the policy outcome. Two policy instruments are 
considered: ICT R&D subsidies and ICT R&D public procurements. Results from the simulations 
suggest that using ICT R&D public procurements results in a comparatively higher impact on 
GDP and employment in the short term. However, this effect fades over time. In the model, 
technological spillovers from ICT R&D public procurement do not fully compensate for the 
lower productivity gains due to the crowding out of ICT sector private R&D expenditures. In the 
long-term, R&D subsidies have the most positive effect on business R&D expenditure in the ICT 
sector and on GDP and employment. 
 The source of finance of the public expenditures also affects outcomes, with distortionary 
effects which reduce benefits. Two sources of finance are considered: lump sum taxation and 
changes in income tax rates. Lump sum taxation generates minimal distortionary effects and 
                                                        
1  The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) is one of the seven research institutes of the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre. 
2  The model was developed under the project Prospective Insights on R&D in ICT (PREDICT 2), a research project co-
financed by the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology and the JRC-IPTS. The 
Institute for Prospective technological Studies (IPTS) is one of seven research institutes of the European Commission's 
Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
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allows us to examine the policy outcome of public expenditures on ICT R&D in a nearly neutral 
context. The results suggest that the financing of expenditure by means of income taxation 
instead of lump sum taxes reduces the policy outcome, particularly in the case of procurement. 
This is due to model assumptions about the negative effects of higher income taxes on labour 
supply.  
A modelling approach relies by its nature on assumptions, most of them sustained by earlier 
empirical results and scientific consensus about relations among variables. The main limitations 
of the exercise proposed in this report result from assumptions and parameter settings pending 
empirical testing. The model is calibrated to replicate a given reference year (2007) and a specified 
reference growth path. The elasticities of substitution in the model are set to reflect estimates in 
the literature. Parameters governing spill-over effects from accumulation of knowledge to R&D 
production in the ICT sector and other sectors are set at levels compatible with estimates reported 
in Coe et al. (2008). Nonetheless, the sensitivity of our finding to assumptions regarding the impact 
of taxation on labour supply, spill-over effects from accumulation of knowledge to R&D production 
in the ICT sector and other sectors, and price elasticities of foreign trade will need to be further 
tested. Envisaged enhancements to the model include considering the Member States on an 
individual basis (currently done for Germany and France only). Further work could also include the 
assessment of other policy instruments such as tax credits or subsidies targeted at ICT R&D 
employment. Further work could also consider alternative sources of financing such as corporate 
taxes, value added taxation or taxes levied on products or production. 
The report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 briefly presents the model and how it can be used for 
policy analysis. Chapter 3 describes the set of policy scenarios examined. Chapter 4 explores the 
model dynamics and examines the effect of public spending on ICT R&D in detail. Chapter 5 
contrasts and compares the impact of the set of policy scenarios we examine. Chapter 6 offers our 
conclusions.    
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1.  Introduction 
Taking outset in the policy actions identified in the EU "Digital Agenda for Europe" (DAE)3, this report 
explores the economic impact of increasing public spending on information and communication 
technology (ICT) research and development (R&D) by EU Member States. For this purpose we 
develop a macroeconomic model4 with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth.  
One of the DAE objectives is that EU Member States double their annual public spending on ICT 
R&D from 2007 to 2020. The notion is that public spending on ICT R&D would leverage private 
R&D spending, help accelerating time-to-market and opening up new markets for ICT solutions 
across the EU. We examine these effects by simulating a set of policies, varying the amount of 
public expenditures on ICT R&D by EU Member States, the policy instrument used and the way in 
which the policy is financed. The model used for the analysis accommodates a range of policy 
instruments that may be used to stimulate R&D activity (ICT or non-ICT) in the economy. It captures 
multiple channels through which R&D activity affects the economy, including the allocation of 
labour and capital, changes in relative prices, consumption and investment decisions, as well as 
foreign trade and productivity.  
The simulation exercise provides some preliminary evidence that an increase in public expenditure 
on ICT R&D might have a significantly positive impact on ICT sector BERD as well as on economic 
growth and employment in the EU. The simulation results suggest that, marginal returns to public 
spending are only slightly diminishing (i.e. a partial achievement of the spending targets, say 75 % 
would result in a marginal impact per euro just above that of full achievement). This indicates that 
there are still substantial gains from reaching the spending target, even from a position of partial 
achievement.  The simulation results also suggest that the level of expenditures chosen by Member 
States affects not only domestic growth and employment, but also the economy in other Member 
States. However, this cross border effect is found to be small. 
The simulation exercise also shows that the strength of the policy impact can be influenced by the 
choice of policy instruments. The analysis considers two policy instruments; ICT R&D subsidies and 
ICT R&D public procurements. Results from the simulations suggest that using ICT R&D public 
procurement result in a comparatively higher impact on GDP and employment in the short run. 
However, this effect would fade with time. In the model, technological spillovers from ICT R&D 
public procurement do not fully compensate the lower productivity gains due to crowding out of ICT 
sector private R&D expenditures. In the long run R&D subsidies would thus have the most positive 
effects on business R&D expenditure in the ICT sector as well as on GDP and employment. 
The source of finance of the public expenditures also affects the policy outcome, with distortionary 
effects reducing benefits. The results suggest that the financing of expenditure by means of 
income taxation instead of lump sum taxes adversely affects the policy outcome, in particular for 
the case of procurement. This is due to model assumptions concerning the negative effects of 
higher income taxes on labour supply. Additional work is needed to gain further insights on the 
sensitivity of these results to the assumptions and parameter setting used in the model.  
The report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 shortly presents the model and how it can be used for 
policy analysis. Chapter 3 describes the set of policy scenarios examined. Chapter 4 explores the 
model dynamics and presents the effects of higher public spending on ICT R&D in the model. 
Chapter 5 contrasts and compares the impact of the different policy scenarios. Chapter 6 
concludes.    
                                                        
3  The DAE is one of the seven flagships initiatives under the "Europe 2020" strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, and is aimed at helping Europe's citizens and businesses to get the most out of digital technologies 
and to stimulate the economy (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R%2801%29) 
4  The model was developed under the project Prospective Insights on R&D in ICT (PREDICT2), a research project co-
financed by the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology and the JRC-IPTS. The 
Institute for Prospective technological Studies (IPTS) is one of seven research institutes of the European Commission's 
Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
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2.  The model  
The model5 has been developed to analyse how an increase in public spending on ICT R&D affects 
the economy. It belongs to the family of dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGE). 
The CGE modelling approach attempts to reproduce the structure of the whole economy and to 
capture economic transactions among different types of economic agents.  The present model is a 
multi-country, multi-sector dynamic CGE with R&D-driven endogenous growth. Indeed, the model 
specifically considers businesses, households, and the public sector as separate actors, and 
contains a set of country blocs: in this report, these consist of Germany, France, the rest of the EU 
(REU) and the rest of the World (RoW).6 Germany and France have been selected because of their 
sizable amount of R&D spending in the EU region. Combined these two countries comprise about 
49 % of the total EU BERD, 43% of Total R&D public funding and 47% of total Gross Expenditure 
on R&D (GERD)7. In this report, we report the economic impact on public ICT R&D expenditures on 
the EU as a whole, and on Germany and France. Results for the country bloc Rest of the EU are not 
reported separately as this consists of a very diverse group of economies with respect to their 
industry structure and public spending on ICT R&D. 
In the model, each country bloc consists of a set of representative households which consume final 
goods and supply labour of a given skills level (low, medium or high) to the domestic production 
sectors. Each country bloc also contains a set of final goods producing sectors, homogenous capital 
producers, differentiated capital producers and R&D producers. The national government in each 
region collects taxes, pays out transfers and purchases government consumption. The EU Member 
States also pay contributions to the EU and receive EU transfers.  
The model includes two types of R&D, R&D by the ICT sector and R&D by the non-ICT sectors. It 
has been designed to address some of the issues that are central to the assessment of alternative 
ICT R&D funding policies.  
 First, the model accommodates a range of policy instruments to finance public R&D 
spending and contains multiple transmission channels through which this can stimulate 
private R&D and affect the economy.   
 Second, in the model R&D output contributes to a common pool of intangible knowledge 
capital available to firms across sectors and countries. However, while, a firm's R&D-
produced knowledge serves as a non-rival non-excludable public good benefitting all firms, 
the new knowledge is also sold as blueprints that provide the purchasing firm with the 
exclusive right to its use in production. In the model, this excludable knowledge entitles the 
purchasing firm to a monopoly rent that covers the initial R&D expenditures. 
 Third, the model captures multiple channels through which R&D activity affects the 
economy, including the allocation of labour, capital and goods. Also, R&D producing firms 
compete for scarce resources with firms in other sectors. Hence, a change in R&D activity 
affects relative prices and the allocation of resources across the economy. For example, if 
the supply of skilled labour responds slowly to increasing demand from a growing R&D 
activity, this affects skilled labour wages and production costs across the economy. R&D in 
the model serves as an engine for growth through multiple channels. Firstly, R&D-produced 
                                                        
5  The model is extensively described in two separate reports:  
Christensen, M. A. (2015a). A CGE model with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth: A general description. 
Christensen, M. A. (2015b). A CGE model with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth: A detailed model description. 
These two reports were preceded by several preparatory studies: 
Stančík J., Rohman I.K. (2014). Public ICT R&D funding in the European Union. 
Szewczyk W., Stančík J., Christensen M. A. (2014). Investigation of ICT Firms' Decisions on R&D Investment. 
Szewczyk W., Sabadash A.  (2012). Macroeconomic Modelling of Public R&D Expenditures on ICT 
Stančík J. (2012). A Methodology for Estimating Public ICT R&D Expenditures in the EU.  
All reports are available at: http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/PREDICTreports.html 
6  An extension could consider separately several other Member States. 
7  JRC-IPTS. (2015). THE 2015 PREDICT Report: An Analysis of ICT R&D in the EU and Beyond.  
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knowledge expands the common pool of knowledge, which spills over into increased 
productivity in R&D production as firms' benefit from the production of new knowledge and 
insights. Secondly, R&D leads to the development of new designs or blueprints, expanding 
the range of available production technologies. This is the case for ICT and for non-ICT 
production technologies. Thirdly, ICT technology in the model is a multipurpose technology, 
widely adopted across the economy in combination with skilled labour. Hence, an R&D-
induced increase in new ICT technologies affects the production of goods and services 
across a broad range of sectors in the economy. 
The model is calibrated to replicate a given reference year (2007) and a specified reference growth 
path. The elasticities of substitution in the model are set to reflect estimates in the literature. 
Parameters governing spill-over effects from accumulation of knowledge to R&D production in the 
ICT sector and other sectors are set at levels compatible to estimates reported in Coe et al. (2008). 
A more detailed non-technical presentation of the model can be found in Christensen (2015a) while 
a more technical presentation of the model can be found in Christensen (2015b). 
A strength of the CGE modelling approach is that it allows for flexibility in building the policy 
scenario one wishes to examine. Having defined the policy objective the choice of policy scenario 
can be presented, by analogy, as a 3 dimensional Rubik's cube, where one chooses as input the 
policy specifications along the following 3 dimensions: 
 Dimension 1: Expenditure. The model allows specifying how much money is allocated to the 
policy. Most relations in the model are non-linear, hence, doubling the money spent on a 
policy does not necessarily double the policy outcome.  
 Dimension 2: Policy instruments. One can specify which policy instruments to use to fulfil 
the policy objectives. Different policy instruments work through different channels in the 
economy and may largely influence how successful the policy is in reaching the desired 
objective. The model allows us to examine a large range of policy instruments including 
general subsidies, tax credits, public procurement and subsidies targeted at employment.  
 Dimension 3: Sources of finance. It can be decided how the public expenditure for the 
chosen policy is financed. Choices on resource allocation include reducing other 
expenditures (e.g. public consumption or public transfers), increasing fiscal revenues (e.g. 
income or, value added tax) or public borrowing (this corresponding to an inter-temporal 
shift of future public expenditures to now). One needs to be aware that a given policy 
action carry opportunity costs in the form of foregone alternative use of the resource 
allocated to the policy. 
 
In addition the choice of policy scenario involves a decision on the timing of the policy. Should the 
policy change be introduced immediately in one single step or gradually phased in over time. 
The policy scenario may also cover multiple country blocs in the model at the same time. One may 
vary the policy choice per country blocs to illustrate varying policy priorities across EU Member 
States.     
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3.  Selection of policy scenarios 
In this report we examine the economic impact of the European Commission policy objectives of 
increasing public spending by EU Member States on ICT R&D. Taking outset in the DAE policy action 
we build a set of alternative policy scenarios. These policy scenarios vary with respect to 
expenditures allocated to the policy, policy instruments and sources of financing.8 
The DAE, in its R&D-related pillar, expects Member States to double their annual public spending on 
ICT research and development. In Action 55, the DAE states that EU Member States should, by 
2020, double annual total public spending on ICT R&D from € 5.5 billion to € 11 billion (which 
include EU programmes).9 The notion is that this should leverage an increase in private R&D 
spending and contribute to sustainable growth. 
Analysis of public spending on ICT R&D by EU Member States shows that Member States still have 
a way to go to reach the DAE target of doubling public spending on ICT R&D. Assuming a unified 
growth rate in national public spending10 on ICT R&D, the difference between the compound 
growths rates (estimated and target) increased from only 1.2% in 2008 to 25.2% in 2013. At 
levels, the EU should have achieved €7.6 billion in 2013 while the actual spending only amounts to 
€6.2 billion. (see Rohman (2015)). In addition the gap between the spending target and actual 
spending varies greatly amongst the EU Member States. For example the ICT R&D public spending 
in 2013 was 41% below the target in France, 17% below target in Germany, 14% below target in 
the UK, and 24% above target in Sweden. 
Having knowledge of this situation, we now elaborate the scenarios that will be submitted to the 
model. 
 In this report, we consider three alternative developments in public spending on ICT 
R&D. In the first, we assume that public spending on ICT R&D in all EU Member States 
amounts to 75 % of the spending target in 2020. In the second, we assume that the public 
spending target on ICT R&D is reached in Germany by 2020 while ICT R&D public spending 
make up 75 % of the target in all other EU Member States. We choose Germany as this is 
the country block with public spending closest to the DAE target in 2013. In the third we 
assume that the DAE spending target is reached by 2020. Hence, public spending on ICT 
R&D doubles from 2007 to 2020 in all EU Member States.  
For the timing of the policy it is assumed that the public spending on ICT R&D increases at 
a constant growth rate from 2007 to 2020. After 2020 the public expenditures are 
assumed to grow at the model long term trend rate.  
 Action 55 in the DAE mentions a number of policy instruments that could be used to 
increase public spending on ICT R&D. These include research grants, tax credits, public 
support to universities and pre-commercial procurement of ICT R&D11. In this report we 
consider two different policy instruments. Firstly we consider the use of a general ad 
valorem subsid to the ICT R&D sector. This policy instrument targets the market price of 
R&D output. Secondly, we examine a policy of pre-commercial procurement of ICT R&D. 
This policy instrument targets the demand for ICT R&D. 
                                                        
8  The selection has been discussed with DG CNECT representatives as to target a set of feasible and policy most 
relevant scenarios. 
9
  These figures are estimations based on the methodology proposed in Stančík J., Rohman I.K. (2014) to compute by 
industry (NACE) shares of Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D (GBAORD), starting from data 
available according to the NABS classification (Nomenclature for the Analysis and comparison of Scientific programmes 
and Budget). This methodology has also been used to produce the input data used for the simulations. 
10  The DAE specifies that public ICT R&D expenditures should double over the period 2007-2020. It does not, however, 
specify a rate of progress over time. Therefore, Stancik and Rohman (2014) assigned in the analysis a uniform 
progress rate: a 5.48% annual growth rate.  
11  Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) is the procurement of research and development of new innovative solutions 
before they are commercially available.  
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 Finally, we consider two alternative ways to finance the policy. One consists in 
allowing the policy to be fully financed by an increase in lump sum taxes paid by 
households to governments. The national governments each year increase the lump sum 
payments by non-liquidity constrained households, such that the primary budget balance is 
unaffected by the policy change. Financing the policy by the use of a lump sum taxes in the 
model generate minimal distortionary effects and allows examining the economic effects 
of increased public expenditures on ICT R&D in a nearly neutral context. In the second 
alternative, the policy action is assumed to be fully financed by an increase in income 
taxes. The national government adjust each year the income tax rates of all employees 
such that the primary budget balance is unaffected by the policy change. All household 
types are subject to identical percentage point changes in their income tax rate. This 
introduces distortionary effects that will affect labour supply and relative prices within the 
economy.    
 
The chosen policy specifications provide us with a total of 12 alternative policy scenarios, which 
can be aggregated into four groups based on the policy instrument and the source of financing 
(Table 1). Comparing scenarios within a group allow us to examine effects of changing expenditure 
levels holding policy instruments and sources of financing constant. For example, comparing 
scenario 1 to scenario 2 allows us to examine the effects of higher public spending in Germany 
(holding policy instrument and financing constant). Comparisons of scenarios between groups allow 
us to examine the effects of policy instrument or sources of financing. For example, comparing 
scenario 1 in group 1 to scenario 4 in group 2 allow us to examine the effects of varying the policy 
instrument (holding expenditure and financing constant). All 12 policy scenario have been 
simulated with the model and compared to a reference scenario, in which no policy changes are 
introduced and public expenditure on ICT R&D is assumed to make up a constant proportion of 
GDP12. 
Table 1: Policy scenarios examined 
 
 
                                                        
12  In the reference scenario we assume that public expenditures on ICT R&D grow at the same nominal rate as GDP. 
Hence, public expenditures as a proportion of GDP will remain as they were in 2007. This is the reference which this 
model release is calibrated to replicate. The model is calibrated to a dataset constructed from GTAP, national account 
data, OECD data and the PREDICT database. The reference year is 2007 as this corresponded to the latest available 
GTAP dataset, at the time of calibration of this model release. A description of the model calibration can be found in 
Christensen (2015b). 
Expenditure Policy instruments Financing
Group 1 Scenario 1 Spending target reached 75 pct. in all member states R&D subsidies Lump sum taxes
Scenario 2 Spending target reached 100 pct. in Germany 
Spending target reached 75 pct. in other member states
R&D subsidies Lump sum taxes
Scenario 3 Spending target reached 100 pct. in all member states R&D subsidies Lump sum taxes
Group 2 Scenario 4 Spending target reached 75 pct. in all member states Public procurements Lump sum taxes
Scenario 5 Spending target reached 100 pct. in Germany 
Spending target reached 75 pct. in other member states
Public procurements Lump sum taxes
Scenario 6 Spending target reached 100 pct. in all member states Public procurements Lump sum taxes
Group 3 Scenario 7 Spending target reached 75 pct. in all member states R&D subsidies Income tax rates
Scenario 8 Spending target reached 100 pct. in Germany 
Spending target reached 75 pct. in other member states
R&D subsidies Income tax rates
Scenario 9 Spending target reached 100 pct. in all member states R&D subsidies Income tax rates
Group 4 Scenario 10 Spending target reached 75 pct. in all member states Public procurements Income tax rates
Scenario 11 Spending target reached 100 pct. in Germany 
Spending target reached 75 pct. in other member states
Public procurements Income tax rates
Scenario 12 Spending target reached 100 pct. in all member states Public procurements Income tax rates
 10 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a full presentation of the economic impacts that would result from 
reaching the spending target in all Member States: it consists in doubling of public expenditures in 
all Member States by 2020, as expected by the DAE policy (scenario 3). Chapter 5 contrasts and 
compares the impact of different policy scenarios  
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4.  Impact of higher public ICT R&D spending 
In this chapter, we explore the model dynamics by considering in detail the results of scenario 3, in 
which all EU Member States double public spending on ICT R&D from 2007 to 2020. The additional 
public expenditure is given as a general ad valorem subsidy to the ICT sector R&D and is financed 
by an increase in public lump sum taxes paid by the non-liquidity constrained households13. We 
choose scenario 3 to illustrate the impact of higher public spending for the following reasons. 
Firstly, in scenario 3 we assume that the DAE spending target is reached by all Member States. This 
scenario, hence, gives an indication of the potential benefits from fulfilling the policy objectives set 
out in DAE. Secondly, the public expenditures in scenario 3 is financed by lump sum taxes which 
allows us to examine the potential effects of increasing public spending in a near neutral context. 
We consider the economic impact on the EU as a whole, and on Germany and France. Results for 
the country bloc Rest of the EU are not reported as this consists of a very diverse group of 
economies with respect to their industry structure and public spending on ICT R&D. 
The public expenditure on ICT R&D by the EU Member States was 5.3 billion € in 2007. This 
corresponds to 0.043 % of EU GDP.14 The public spending on ICT R&D varies between the EU 
Member States. In 2007 the public spending on ICT R&D was 0.044 % of GDP in Germany and 
0.037 % of GDP in France.15 In scenario 3 we assume that the public expenditure on ICT R&D 
doubles by 2020. The full increase in public expenditures is given in the form of a general ad 
valorem subsidy to R&D providers in the ICT sector.  
The model contains various transmission channels that affect the economic impacts of a given 
policy. In the remaining of this chapter we systematically analyse the impacts of the policy on: 
1. ICT sector business R&D expenditures 
2. GDP and macroeconomic aggregates 
3. Production in the manufacturing sectors 
4. Employment 
5. Foreign trade 
6. Private consumption. 
4.1.  Impact on ICT sector business R&D expenditures 
Higher public subsidies to ICT R&D reduce the relative price of ICT R&D output and thereby reduce 
the cost of developing and introducing new production technologies in the economy. In the model 
this takes the form of new ICT capital varieties. The additional ICT R&D subsidies spur an increase 
in ICT R&D expenditures that leads to an increase in the accumulated knowledge stock. In the 
model a higher stock of knowledge in turn increases productivity of the domestic ICT R&D 
producers and spills over into productivity increases by other R&D producers. The spill-over occurs 
both between sectors and across-borders. 
                                                        
13  Our analysis defines public expenditures on ICT R&D as those given to the ICT sector. In practice a part of public 
expenditures to ICT R&D is given to ICT R&D projects that take place in other sector than the ICT sector. A lack of 
quality data on public ICT R&D expenditure to projects outside the ICT sector means that the model has been 
calibrated to R&D expenditures by sector definitions (rather than by function). One could thus allocate part of the 
public expenditure as subsidies to R&D in the non-ICT sector. However, in this analysis all additional public spending 
on ICT R&D is given to the ICT sector, since the non-ICT sector cover a very broad and diverse selection of R&D 
projects. 
14  Estimates on public expenditure on ICT R&D have been revised sine the release of the model version used in this 
study. Public expenditure on ICT R&D by member states in 2007 was estimated at 5.5 billion € (or 0.44 % of GDP). 
The values for public expenditures used for the calibration of the model are 5.33 billion € for the EU, 1.07 billion € for 
Germany and 0.70 € Billion for France. 
15  The estimated share of ICT GBAORD for France is smaller due to missing data in two NABS chapters (Education and 
Culture). See detail in Stancik and Rohman (2014).  
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Figure 1 shows ICT sector Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) expenditure in scenario 3. R&D 
expenditure is shown in 2007 prices and the series has been de-trended, so that an increase 
equivalent to the model long term trend growth rate of 1.64 % p.a. would correspond to a 
horizontal line. Higher ICT R&D subsidies lead to a gradual and prolonged increase in ICT sector 
BERD. The ICT sector BERD still grows at a rate higher than the trend growth rate more than 10 
years after the public subsidy expenditures is again growing at the model's trend growth rate. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of ICT sector BERD, 2007 prices (scenario 3) 
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The increased public subsidies to ICT R&D lead to an increase in the EU ICT sector's BERD 
expenditure of 7.3 billion € (in 2007 prices) by 2020  rising to 14.8 billion € (in 2007 prices) by 
2040. In 2040, the ICT sector's BERD expenditure increases by 3.4 billion € in Germany and by 
2.2 billion € in France. 
The higher ICT R&D subsidies lead to modest fall in the BERD expenditures by non-ICT sectors of 
the economy. Non-ICT sector BERD in the EU is 0.1 Billion € (2007 prices) lower in 2020 and 
0.2 Billion € lower in 2040 compared to the reference scenario. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of policy on ICT sector BERD, per public EURO spent on ICT R&D funding 
(scenario 3) 
 
Figure 2 shows the impact on ICT sector BERD expenditure per Euro spent on public ICT R&D 
subsidy. The impact of ICT R&D subsidies increases gradually. In 2020 each extra Euro allocated to 
ICT R&D subsidy within the EU leads to an increase in ICT sector BERD expenditure of 1.1 € (2007 
prices). In 2040 each extra Euro allocated to ICT R&D subsidy within the EU leads to an increase in 
ICT sector BERD expenditure of 1.6 € (2007 prices). The impact of doubling ICT R&D subsidies 
varies across Member States. The impact of ICT R&D subsidies is higher in Germany and France 
than in the EU as a whole. Each additional Euro allocated to public subsidies to ICT R&D raises ICT 
sector BERD expenditures in 2040 by 1.8 € in Germany and by a similar magnitude in France. 
4.2  Impact on GDP and macroeconomic aggregates 
The doubling of public expenditures to ICT R&D results in a sustained increase in ICT sector BERD. 
In turn the higher public ICT R&D expenditure gradually spurs the introduction of new ICT 
technologies and an expanding spectrum of ICT capital. This allows firms to produce more from a 
given amount of factor inputs. Because ICT is a general propose technology the introduction of new 
ICT technologies improves productivity across all manufacturing sectors in the economy. The extent 
to which productivity increases in a given sector depends on the intensity by which ICT is used in 
production.16  
The increases in GDP as a result of the higher public subsidies to ICT R&D are shown in figure 3. 
The higher ICT R&D subsidies lead to a gradual increase in GDP relative to the reference scenario.17 
The EU GDP is only marginally higher than in the reference scenario in 2020, but is 0.12 % higher 
in 2040. This corresponds to an increase in EU GDP measured in 2007 prices of 0.7 billion € by 
                                                        
16  The intensity to which ICT is used in production by the different sectors in the model follows the composition of 
material and factor inputs used by the sector in the base year to which the model is calibrated. 
17  The reference scenario describes the situation in which no policy changes have been introduced. In this scenario public 
expenditure on ICT R&D is assumed to make up a constant proportion of GDP.    
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2020, and 25.6 billion € by 2040. Doubling of ICT R&D subsidies leads to higher GDP increases in 
Germany and France than in the EU. By 2040 GDP is 0.17% higher in Germany and 0.14% higher in 
Fance, relative to the reference scenario.  
Figure 3: Change in GDP relative to the reference scenario (scenario 3) 
 
The change in GDP can be decomposed into macroeconomic aggregates as shown in figure 4. The 
higher public subsidies to ICT R&D gradually increase ICT R&D relative to the reference scenario 
and this contributes the most to the higher GDP. In 2040 the contribution of ICT R&D to the change 
in GDP is 0.07 percentage point. Private consumption also gradually increases relative to the 
reference scenario as households benefit from higher income due to productivity increases. Public 
consumption rises in proportion to GDP. Hence, in the long run the contribution from domestic 
consumption makes GDP higher. In 2040 the contribution from domestic consumption within the 
EU to the change in GDP is 0.06 percentage point. 
The EU net exports contribute negatively to the change in GDP. The negative net export is mainly 
due to the following effects. Firstly, the increase in domestic activity pushes up the price of EU 
goods relative to the RoW, which reduces export demand and at the same time shifts domestic 
demand towards imports. 18 Secondly, the ICT R&D contains a relative high share of material inputs 
imported from the RoW. Private consumption also has a relatively high import share. Increases in 
ICT R&D and private consumption, therefore, lead to a rise in the demand for imported goods 
relative to the reference scenario. These two effects combined worsen the EU trade balance 
initially. In 2020 the contribution from net export to the change in EU GDP is 0.04 percentage point. 
Higher productivity due to expanding ICT varieties gradually raises exports and improves the trade 
balance. In 2040 the contribution from EU net export to the change in GDP is still negative but very 
small. However, the contribution from EU net export to the change in GDP becomes positive from 
2043 and onwards. In Germany and France the GDP increase is also mainly driven by higher ICT 
R&D activity and higher domestic demand. Net exports in both countries initially contribute 
negative to GDP but the contribution of net export has become positive by 2040. 
The impact of public expenditures to ICT R&D can also be illustrated by the development in value 
added. Figure 5 shows the development in value added decomposed into the contribution from the 
ICT sector (R&D and manufacturing) and non-ICT sectors of the economy.  
                                                        
18  The extent to which net export changes in response to price change in domestic goods relative to RoW depends on the 
price elasticities for foreign trade. Trade elasticties are normally found to be higher in the long term than in the short 
term. Parameters for trade elasticities in the current model release are assumed to be constant in all time period. 
Hence, the model probably overshoots short run adjustments to foreign trade. Further work will be done to examine 
the sensitivity of results to assumption about trade elasticities. 
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The doubling of public expenditures to ICT R&D through subsidies results in a gradual increase in 
total value added relative to the reference scenario. In 2020 total value added in the EU is 0.01% 
higher than in the reference scenario. In 2040 it is 0.13% higher. A large part of the rise in total 
value added can be contributed to the ICT sector. In 2020 the contribution from the ICT sector to 
total value added in the EU is 0.03 percentage point. This is mainly due to higher R&D activity. The 
value added of the ICT sector gradually increases and contribute 0.05 percentage point to the 
change in total value added in 2040. The long term rise in value added of the ICT sector is driven 
by productivity increases in R&D production due to knowledge accumulation and to introduction of 
new production technologies in manufacturing of ICT goods and services. The other sectors of the 
economy contribute negatively to the change in total EU value added in 2020 (-0.03 percentage 
point). This is driven by the fall in net exports and the migration of production factors towards the 
ICT sector (especially to R&D production). However, as the introduction of new ICT production 
technologies spreads to the other sectors of the economy the value added rises19. The non-ICT 
sectors, thus, contribute 0.08 percentage point to the change in total value added in the EU in 
2040. This is mainly driven by a rise in value added in the service sector.  
A similar impact on value added to that of the EU as a whole can be seen in Germany and France. 
However, the rise in total value added is higher in these two countries. In 2020 total value added is 
0.02% higher than the reference scenario in Germany, and in France. In 2040 total value added in 
Germany and France is 0.17% and 0.14% higher than the reference scenario respectively.  
 
 
  
                                                        
19  The knowledge accumulation from ICT R&D also spreads into R&D in other sectors raising productivity of non-ICT 
R&D production. This in turn leads to introduction of new non-ICT production technologies. 
 16 
Figure 4: Change in GDP decomposed into macroeconomic aggregates (scenario 3) 
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Figure 5: Change in value added decomposed into ICT on non-ICT sectors (scenario 3) 
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Figure 6 shows the impact on GDP per additional Euro allocated to ICT R&D subsidies. Higher ICT 
R&D subsidies increase ICT R&D activity, this expands the spectrum of ICT production technologies 
and raises productivity, and this in turn leads to higher GDP. Hence, by 2040 each extra Euro 
annually allocated to public ICT R&D within the EU leads to an increase in GDP of 2.8 € (2007 
prices). The impact of the policy varies across Member States. Each additional Euro allocated to 
public ICT R&D subsidies raises GDP by 3.75 € in Germany and by 3.65 € in France in 2040.   
Figure 6: Impact of policy on GDP per public EURO spend on ICT R&D (scenario 3) 
 
 
4.3  Impact on production in the manufacturing sectors 
The increase in ICT R&D subsidies leads to a rise in R&D production by the ICT sector. The change in 
R&D output also affects the production by other sectors in the economy. Figure 7 show the change 
in total output (including R&D and manufacturing of goods and services) relative to the reference 
scenario. In 2020 EU total output increases only marginally as a result of the additional ICT R&D 
subsidies. However, the policy brings about significant changes in output by the different sectors of 
the EU economy. The higher R&D activity in the ICT sector makes production factors migrate from 
other sectors to the ICT sector. The allocation of production factors also gives rise to some friction 
due to adjustment costs in the model. This brings about costs in the form of foregone output. 
Changes in R&D activity in the ICT sector also leads to a shift in demand for domestically produced 
and imported material inputs. This affects relative prices of manufactured goods and services and 
the composition of domestic outputs across sectors.  
In the long term the higher R&D production leads to the introduction of new ICT production 
technologies and more intensive ICT use by the manufacturing sectors. This leads to a rise in total 
production. In 2040 the EU total output is 0.12% higher than in the reference scenario. 
Figure 8 shows the change in manufacturing output of goods and services (excl. R&D production) 
relative to the reference scenario. The higher R&D activity in the EU ICT sector initially crowds out 
production by other sectors within the EU. In 2020 manufacturing output of goods and services is 
0.02% lower than in the reference scenario. The change in manufacturing output can be 
decomposed into types of goods and services, as shown in Figure 9. The change in output can 
largely be attributed to lower production of high tech goods, and low tech goods. In the long term 
manufacturing output becomes higher than in the reference scenario. In 2040 manufacturing 
output is 0.08% higher than in the reference scenario. Most of the increase (0.05 percentage point) 
is due to higher output of services. 
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Figure 7: Change in total production relative to the reference scenario (scenario 3) 
 
We may also consider changes in total output by individual EU Member States in the model. Total 
output in Germany and France in 2020 is respectively 0.02 and 0.01% higher than in the reference 
scenario as a result of the additional subsidies to ICT R&D. In 2040 the total output in Germany 
and France is respectively 0.16% and 0.14% higher than the reference scenario. Hence, production 
increases relative more in Germany and France than in the EU as a whole. The higher R&D activity 
in the ICT sector initially crowds out production of goods and services. In 2020 manufacturing 
output of goods and services (excluding R&D production) is 0.01% lower in Germany and 0.02% 
lower in France. The initial lower manufacturing output can in both countries largely be attributed 
to lower production of high tech goods. In 2040 manufacturing output is 0.12% higher in Germany 
and 0.10% higher in France relative to the reference scenario. The increase can mainly be 
contributed to higher output of services.  
Figure 8: Change in manufacturing production relative to the reference scenario 
(scenario 3) 
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Figure 9: Change in manufacturing production decomposed by types of commodity 
(scenario 3)  
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4.4  Impact on employment 
Doubling of ICT R&D subsidies also affects the labour market. Total EU employment increases by 
22,000 full-time-equivalent persons in 2020 and by 148,000 full-time-equivalent persons in 2040. 
Figure 10 shows changes in employment by skills level. The rise in employment is mainly driven by 
an increase in employment of high skilled labour. Employment of high skilled labour in the EU 
increases by 3,100 full-time-equivalent persons in 2020 and by 111,000 full-time-equivalent 
persons in 2040. Employment of low skilled labour in the EU increases by 5,400 full-time-
equivalent persons in 2020 and by 2,700 full-time-equivalent persons in 2040. Employment of 
medium skilled labour in the EU increases by 13,400 full-time-equivalent persons in 2020 and by 
34,200 full-time-equivalent persons in 2040. The shift in employment towards high skilled labour 
is mainly driven by three developments. Firstly, a structural shift in the economy, secondly, 
substitution between labour types as a result of more intensive ICT use in production, and, thirdly 
an increase in productivity of high skilled labour employed in R&D production as a result of a higher 
stock of accumulated R&D knowledge.  
Let us first examine the effects of structural shifts in the economy. Figure 11 shows the change in 
total employment by different production sectors in the economy.20 The largest contribution to the 
change in employment is caused by ICT sector R&D, production of other services and 
manufacturing of ICT goods and services. These three activities lead to increases in employment of 
respectively 73,800 full-time-equivalent persons, 60,500 full-time-equivalent persons and 7,300 
full-time-equivalent persons in 2040. In the model these three sectors are characterised by the 
most intensive use of high skilled labour within the EU and the least intensive use of low skilled 
labour. Hence, the shift in employment towards ICT sector R&D, other services and manufacturing 
of ICT goods and services, leads to a large increase in high skilled employment and a more modest 
increase in low skilled employment. 
We may also examine the effects of substitution between labour types. The higher R&D activity by 
the ICT sector leads to the introduction of new ICT production technologies and to a more intensive 
use of ICT capital in production of goods and services. ICT capital in the model is operated by high 
skilled labour. Hence, the more intensive use of ICT in production brings about a substitution of 
employment from low and medium skilled labour to high skilled labour. For example, in 2040 high 
skilled employment in the EU service sector increases by 80,400 full-time-equivalent persons, 
while medium skilled employment declines by 7,400 full-time persons and low skilled employment 
decline by 12,500 full-time-equivalent persons. 
Finally, the higher stock of accumulated knowledge due to increased ICT R&D activity raises 
productivity of high skilled labour employed in the R&D production. In 2040 the productivity of high 
skilled labour employed in ICT R&D production is 2.0% higher than in the reference scenario. 
These three effects combined raise the total demand for high skilled labour and drive up wages. As 
a result labour supply of high skilled labour increases. 
Employment in Germany and France are subject to the same effects as the EU total. In 2040 high 
skilled employment in Germany increases by 29,900 full-time persons, medium skilled employment 
increases by 11,000 full-time-equivalent persons, and low skilled employment increases by 1,700 
full-time-equivalent persons. In France high skilled employment increases by 17,400 full-time-
equivalent persons and medium skilled employment increases by 3,600 full-time-equivalent 
persons in 2040. Low skilled employment in France in 2040 is 300 full-time-equivalent persons 
lower than the reference scenario. This decline in low skilled employment is caused by two effects. 
Firstly, employment of low skilled labour decline as a result of a shift in production towards sectors 
with less intensive use of low skilled labour. Secondly, employment of low skilled labour falls as a 
result of ICT driven substitution towards high skilled labour. These two effects dominate the extra 
labour demand for low skilled labour due to higher total output.  
                                                        
20  Note that we distinguish between production of ICT goods and services and ICT sector R&D. 
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Figure 10: Change in employment by types of skills (scenario 3) 
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Figure 11: Change in employment by sector (scenario 3) 
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Examining the changes in employment due to policy changes one had to bear in mind that the 
model does not include endogenous changes in the skills composition of the work force driven by 
e.g. unemployment or wage differentials. In the model the proportion of say high skilled labour is 
exogenous given, while the households at the margin decide how many hours to work21. 
4.5  Impact on foreign trade 
As discussed above, the EU net exports contribute negatively to the change in GDP.22 This is mainly 
due to two effects. Firstly, a rise in the price of domestic goods and services relative to the RoW 
lowers demands for EU exports and at the same increases EU demand for imports from the RoW. 
Secondly, public ICT R&D subsidies result in higher ICT R&D activity and as the production of ICT 
R&D uses imported inputs more intensively this shifts demand towards imported goods and 
services. EU net exports gradually improve as a result of productivity increases from the 
introduction of new production technologies. In the long term (after 2043) the contribution from EU 
net export to GDP becomes positive.  
Figure 12 shows the contribution to GDP from net export decomposed by trade partners. For the EU 
any change in GDP from net export is per definition due to change in trade position against the rest 
of the world. For Germany and France the bulk of the change in GDP from net export can also be 
contributed to the trade position against the RoW. The trade position against the RoW gradually 
improves for both countries. Germany and France also gradually improve their trade position 
against the rest of the EU, as a result of higher productivity increases in those two countries. In 
2040 net exports to the rest of the EU contribute positively to the change in GDP in both countries. 
Figure 13 shows the contribution from net exports to the change in GDP decomposed into types of 
commodities. The contribution to GDP from net exports is at first negative for all types of goods 
and services. The numerically largest contribution to the change in GDP from net exports is due to 
trade in high tech manufacturing and to trade in services. The gradual improvement in net exports 
is seen across all commodity types.23  
 
  
                                                        
21  Allowing for endogenous shifts between skills categories in the work force would possibly affect the results, and may 
lead to even larger increases in high skilled employment.     
22  The extent to which net export changes in response to a relative price increase in domestic goods relative to the RoW 
depends on the price elasticities for foreign trade.  
23  German net export of high tech manufactured goods improves slowly. German manufacturers of high tech goods do 
not experience the same productivity gains as producers in other sector. This is because they intensively use non-ICT 
high-tech variety capital in production. They, therefore, do not benefit to the same extent from higher ICT R&D 
expenditures as producers in other sectors. 
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Figure 12: Change in GDP from net exports decomposed by trade partner (scenario 3) 
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Figure 13: Change in GDP from net exports decomposed by commodity types (scenario 3) 
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4.6  Impact on private consumption 
The rise in public subsidies to ICT R&D affects the consumption possibilities of households in the 
EU. At first the increase in ICT R&D expenditures crowds out household consumption: in 2020, 
private consumption is marginally lower than in the reference scenario. However, households 
gradually increase consumption relative to the reference scenario. This long term increase in 
consumption is induced by productivity gains from the introduction of new ICT technologies in 
production of goods and services.  
Figure 14 shows the contribution from private consumption to the change in GDP. The contribution 
has been decomposed into commodity types. Private consumption in the EU contribute 0.02 
percentage point to the change in EU GDP in 2030 and 0.04 percentage point to the change in EU 
GDP in 2040 (in total EU GDP is 0.07 % higher than the reference scenario in 2030 and 0.12% 
higher.in 2040). The bulk of the rise in private consumption is due to higher consumption of 
services. The consumption of services corresponds to more than half of the rise in private 
consumption. Considering Germany and France show a similar gradual rise in private consumption, 
with more than half of the rise in private consumption due to the consumption of services. The 
contribution to GDP from private consumption is higher in Germany than in France. In 2040 German 
private consumption contributes 0.06 percentage points to the rise in German GDP, while French 
private consumption contributes 0.04 percentage points to the rise in French GDP.   
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Figure 14: Change in GDP from private consumption decomposed commodity types 
(scenario 3)  
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As illustrated in Figure 15, most of the long term rise in private consumption is due to higher 
consumption of domestic (within country block) produced consumer goods and services.   
Figure 15: Change in GDP from private consumption decomposed by country of origin 
(scenario 3) 
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5.  Alternative policy scenarios 
In the previous chapter we examined the dynamics of the model using scenario 3 in which public 
ICT R&D expenditure double by 2020 in all Member States, R&D subsidies is used as policy 
instrument and the policy is funded by an increase in lump sum taxes paid by the non-liquidity 
constrained households. In the following, we will use the model to contrast and compare the 12 
policy scenario outlined in section 3, where three different levels of target achievement are 
grouped with respect to the policy instrument used (subsidies or procurement) and financing 
sources (lump sum taxes vs. increase in income tax rates). The comparison is made within and 
between groups.  
5.1  Varying the level of expenditure 
One of DAE objectives is that EU Member States double their annual public spending on ICT R&D 
from 2007 to 2020. However, as discussed above, EU countries combined still have a way to go to 
reach this target, and some of them are very far from it. 
We therefore examine the economic impact of varying spending levels of public expenditure on ICT 
R&D. Figure 16 shows the change in GDP at varying public spending levels, if ICT R&D subsidies are 
used as policy instrument and the policy is funded by lump sum taxes paid by households.  
The figure shows that the impact of ICT R&D subsidies on GDP materialises slowly. In 2020 EU GDP 
is almost unaffected by rises in ICT R&D public subsidies, even when the public spending target is 
reached. Changes in German and French GDP in 2020 are also minimal.  
In the longer run, the impact on GDP becomes higher. The change in GDP is driven by productivity 
improvements following the introduction of new ICT production technologies resulting from the 
higher ICT sector BERD. In the range of public expenditures we consider, returns to public ICT R&D 
expenditure are only slightly diminishing, so that the impact of different levels of public spending 
on GDP is almost linear. For example, increasing ICT R&D public expenditures in all Member States 
by 50 % (scenario 1) leads to a rise in EU GDP of 0.06 %, while doubling ICT R&D public 
expenditures in all EU Member States (scenario 3) leads to an increase in EU GDP of 0.12 %. This 
indicates that there are substantial benefits from increasing ICT R&D public expenditures further 
even from a position where Member State already partially have reached the spending target. 
The only slightly diminishing returns to public ICT R&D expenditures can also be seen by 
considering the policy impact per Euro spend. In 2040 each additional euro spent on ICT R&D 
subsidies in the EU leads to a rise in EU GDP of 2.87 € if the spending target is reached 75% 
(scenario 1). The impact indicator is slightly lower when the spending target is fully reached in 
scenario 3 (2.81 for EU GDP). The highest impact on EU GDP per Euro spent on ICT R&D subsidies is 
found in scenario 2 in which Germany is the only country that reaches the spending target. In this 
scenario each additional Euro that is spent on ICT R&D subsidies in 2040 increases EU GDP by 
2.95 €. Each Euro spent on ICT R&D subsidies in Germany has a higher impact on GDP than in the 
other two country blocks of EU Member States in the model. The long term impact on German GDP 
of ICT R&D subsidies in Germany is between 3.6 and 3.9 times the expenditure in 2040, depending 
on the scenario considered. 
Our results show that Germany would benefit from a higher GDP in the long term if ICT R&D public 
expenditures in Germany increases relative more than in other Member States. German GDP in 
2040 rises 0.16% instead of and 0.09% if Germany reaches the spending target by 2020 and 
other Member States reach 75% of the target only. However, in the medium term German GDP 
would be negatively affected. In 2020, German GDP would become 0.03 percentage point lower 
due to a worsening of net exports24, while GDP in other Member States would rise marginally as a 
                                                        
24  This is mainly due to two effects. Firstly, an increase in the price of German goods relative to other countries, which 
reduced export demand for German goods and shift domestic demand in Germany towards imports. Secondly, the 
relative high share of material inputs imported from RoW in German ICT sector BERD which raises import demand. 
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result of improvements in the bilateral trade balance with Germany. In the long term this effect 
would fade. 
Figure 16 also shows (comparing scenario 2 to scenario 3) that Germany benefits from a small rise 
in GDP in the short term as well as in the long term as a result of higher ICT R&D public spending in 
the other Member States. This suggests that increasing ICT R&D public expenditure across many 
Member States generate small positive spill-overs.  
The impact of varying public spending levels on employment is portrayed in Figure 17. EU 
employment in 2040 in scenario 1 (in which Member States reach the spending target by 75%) 
rises by 75,200 full-time-equivalent persons. It is interesting to note that the largest part of the 
rise (56,600 full-time-equivalent persons) is due to higher employment of high skilled labour. The 
rise in high skilled employment is driven by higher R&D activity and more intensive use of ICT in 
production that leads to a substitution from low skilled and medium skilled labour towards high 
skilled labour.  
Similarly to the case of GDP, employment returns to ICT R&D public expenditures in the model are 
weakly diminishing: a 50% increase in ICT R&D public spending raises EU employment by 75,200 
full-time-equivalent persons while a doubling of public ICT R&D spending raises employment by an 
additional 72,800 full-time-equivalent persons.  
If all Member States reach the DAE ICT R&D public spending target by 2020 then EU employment 
in 2040 would increase by 148,000 full-time-equivalent persons relative to the reference scenario, 
with high skilled labour increasing by 111,100 full-time-equivalent persons.   
Looking at Scenario 2, where Germany reaches the DAE ICT R&D public spending target by 2020 
and other Member States reaches 75% of the target, employment in Germany would increase by 
42,800 full-time-equivalent persons relative to the reference scenario,. Results show that ICT R&D 
spending in Germany only marginally affects long term employment in other Member States, while 
Germany would be affected from a change in ICT R&D public spending by all other Member States, 
especially with respect to the skills composition of employment.25 
Considering the impact on ICT sector BERD in 2040 each additional Euro spent on ICT R&D 
subsidies in the EU leads to a rise in ICT sector BERD of 1.65 € in scenario 1 in which the spending 
levels in all Member States corresponds to 75% of the spending target. Returns are slightly lower 
(1.62 €) in scenario 3 in which the spending target is fully reached. A similar result can be observed 
for the impact indicators for Germany holding public spending levels constant in all other Member 
States at 75% of the spending target. In Germany each additional EURO spent on ICT R&D 
subsidies leads to a rise in ICT sector BERD of 1.87 € if Germany reaches 75% of the DAE spending 
target (scenario 1), compared to 1.84 € if Germany reaches the DAE spending target in full 
(scenario 2). 
Our results indicate that the impact of ICT R&D subsidies on ICT sector BERD in a given EU Member 
State is largely unaffected by the spending levels in other EU countries. The impact per Euro spent 
on ICT R&D subsidies in Germany is stable irrespectively on whether all other Member States 
reaches the spending target in full or reaches it by 75%. Similarly, the impact per Euro spent on ICT 
R&D public subsidies in France is stable whether Germany reaches the target in full or reaches it by 
75%, all else being equal.  
 
 
 
                                                        
25  Figure 17 shows that the skills composition of employment in Germany changes as a result of higher ICT R&D public 
spending in other Member States. German employment of high skilled labour rises by an additional 2,200 full-time-
equivalent persons if other member states move from 75 % of the spending target to fully reaching the target. 
However, the rise in high skilled employment is offset by a decline in employment of low and medium skilled labour. 
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Figure 16: Changes in GDP at varying ICT R&D public expenditure levels 
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Figure 17: Changes in employment in the long term at varying ICT R&D public 
expenditure levels 
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5.2  Varying the policy instrument: general subsidy vs public 
procurement 
Amongst policy instruments referred to in DAE, in the previous section we considered ICT R&D 
subsidies. In this section we will examine public pre commercial procurement targeted at ICT R&D, 
(group 2 scenarios) comparing its effects to the outcome of ICT R&D subsidies (group 1).  
To this end, we assume that public expenditure on ICT R&D is used entirely for ICT R&D 
procurement, and that this additional ICT R&D purchased by national governments is not sold as 
blueprints for the development of new commercial ICT technologies, but made freely available for 
all R&D providers. The accumulated knowledge from ICT R&D procurements hence increases 
productivity of R&D producers in the ICT sector and spills to R&D producers in the non-ICT sector.26 
This corresponds to the case where the public sector is funding basic research.  
Figure 18 shows the development in ICT sector BERD at varying policy instruments when the 
spending target is reached by all Member States and the policy is funded by an increase in lump 
sum taxes paid by households. All series in the figure are in 2007 prices and has been de-trended 
with the model's trend growth rate of 1.64% p.a. to 2007 levels. Hence, a horizontal line in the 
graphs corresponds to an increase equivalent to the model's long term growth rate.  
Comparing the development in ICT sector BERD in the two policy scenarios we find that higher 
public ICT R&D spending leads to an increase in ICT sector BERD irrespective on which policy 
instrument is used. However, ICT sector BERD increases much less when ICT R&D public 
procurement is used as policy instrument (scenario 6) than when ICT R&D subsidies are used 
(scenario 3): in 2040 each additional Euro spent on ICT R&D public procurements in the EU leads to 
an increase in the ICT sector BERD of 0.95 €, compared to 1.62 € when ICT R&D subsidies were 
used as policy instrument.27 For Germany and France the impact per Euro is 1.02 € (against 1.84 €) 
and 1.03 € (against 1.76 €) respectively if ICT R&D public procurement is used.       
ICT sector BERD includes all business enterprise expenditures on R&D by the ICT sector, no matter 
whether it is funded commercially or by public procurements. To examine the impact on 
commercial R&D expenditures in the ICT sector we can construct a variable that only includes ICT 
sector BERD that is not funded by the increase in public procurement. This is done by subtracting 
the additional public expenditures on ICT R&D procurements from total ICT sector BERD. We name 
this variable ICT sector BERD excluding public procurements. Figure 18 also shows the development 
in ICT sector BERD excluding public procurements in scenario 6. As shown, the slower growth in ICT 
sector BERD with respect to subsidies is mostly explained by crowding out. The increase in public 
ICT R&D procurements crowds out commercial R&D provision in the model. The policy instrument 
stimulates demand for R&D and this additional demand competes for scares resources with the 
existing R&D production. 
In 2020, EU ICT sector BERD in scenario 6 is 3.6 billion € (2007 prices) higher than in the reference scenario, while 
ICT sector BERD excluding public procurements is 3.0 billion € lower. From 2020 on, we assume that 
ICT R&D public procurement grow at the model's trend growth rate: ICT sector BERD continues to 
rise at a higher growth rate as a result of the improved productivity in R&D production driven by 
knowledge accumulation. By 2040 ICT sector BERD excluding public procurements would be 0.4 
billion € lower than in the reference scenario, while ICT sector BERD is 8.7 billion € higher.28  
  
                                                        
26  In the scenarios in group 2 we assume that ICT R&D from public procurements affects productivity of R&D producers 
at the same magnitude as commercial R&D. Further work on the effects of public procurements could modify this 
assumption. 
27  Corresponding to a difference in ICT sector BERD of 6.1 billion € (2007 prices) between scenario 6 and scenario 3. 
28  ICT sector BERD excluding public procurement in the EU continues to grow at a higher rate in scenario 6 and becomes 
higher than in the reference scenario in 2047. 
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Figure 18: ICT sector BERD at different policy instruments (2007 prices and levels) 
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We see a similar development in ICT sector BERD in Germany and France. In 2020 ICT sector BERD 
excluding public procurement become lower than in the reference scenario as a result of crowding 
out. In Germany it is 0.5 billion € lower, while it is 0.3 billion € lower in France (2007 prices). In the 
long run ICT sector BERD excluding public procurements rises. In 2040 ICT sector BERD excluding 
public procurement become marginally higher than in the reference scenario. In Germany it is 
43 million € higher and in France it is 38 million € higher (2007 prices).  
Figure 19 compares the change in GDP for polices using ICT R&D subsidies and ICT R&D public 
procurement.29 All policies shown in the figure are funded by an increase in lump sum taxes paid by 
households. 
An increase in ICT R&D public procurement leads to higher GDP than in the reference scenario and, 
up to 2023, also a higher GDP than if ICT R&D subsidies are used. In the longer term, however, ICT 
R&D subsidies bring progressively higher long term GDP compared to ICT R&D public 
procurement.30  
Figure 20 further examines the effects of ICT R&D public procurement by decomposing the 
changes in GDP in scenario 6 into macroeconomic aggregates. The figure shows that higher GDP in 
2020 is mainly driven by an increase in R&D activity in the ICT sector, and by higher non-ICT 
investments. The crowding out of private ICT sector R&D expenditures leads to a drop in ICT 
investments. Lower domestic consumption also contribute negative to EU GDP. In scenario 6 we do 
not observe an initial worsening of the trade balance. In the model ICT R&D public procurement 
generates a more modest rise in domestic demand than ICT R&D subsidies and hence does not to 
the same extend drive up domestic prices relative to RoW. Furthermore the structural shift in 
economic activity is not systematically towards components of the economy with higher import 
components. Hence, net export initially contributes positive to GDP.  
The additional ICT sector BERD caused by ICT R&D public procurements does not directly result in 
new blueprint that broadens the spectrum of ICT technologies. However, the public purchase of ICT 
R&D contributes to the accumulation of knowledge. In the long term spill-over effects from ICT 
R&D public procurement therefore, raise productivity in R&D production, and hence the production 
of blueprint. Higher ICT R&D activity and the introduction of new production technologies in 
production gradually improves productivity across manufactoring sectors of the economy and leads 
to higher GDP. However, in the long term EU GDP increases less than in scenario 3 in which ICT 
R&D subsidies are used. 
Figure 21 compares the effect on value added of doubling public expenditures for ICT R&D using 
ICT R&D subsidies (scenario 3) and ICT R&D public procurement (scenario 6) respectively. In the 
short term total value added rises more when ICT R&D procurement is used as policy instrument. In 
2020 total value added in the EU is 0.03% higher than in the reference scenario (compared to 
0.1% if ICT R&D subsidies are used). However, in the long term value added rises less when ICT 
R&D procurement is used. In 2040 total value added in the EU is 0.04% higher than in the 
reference scenario (compared to 0.13% if ICT R&D subsidies are used). The smaller long term 
impact from ICT R&D procurement arises from crowding out of private ICT R&D expenditures and 
the introduction of fewer new ICT technologies that leads to a lower increase in ICT sector value 
added. Furthermore, the introduction of fewer ICT technologies leads to a smaller long term rise in 
non-ICT sector value added.  
  
                                                        
29  Scenarios in which ICT R&D subsidies are used are marked with a full line, while scenarios in which ICT R&D public 
procurement is used are show with a stippled. Scenarios with identical spending levels are shown in the same colour. 
30  For example, a doubling of public ICT R&D spending leads to a rise in GDP of 0.03 % in 2020 if ICT R&D public 
procurement is used as policy instrument (scenario 6), but only to a marginal rise in GDP if ICT R&D subsidies is used 
(scenario 3). GDP in 2040 rises 0.12% if ICT R&D subsidies are used compared to 0.03 % if ICT R&D public 
procurement is used.  
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Figure 19: Changes in GDP at different policy instruments 
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Figure 20: Change in GDP decomposed into macroeconomic aggregates (Scenario 6)  
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Figure 21: Change in value added at different policy instruments  
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The higher ICT R&D public procurement also leads to a rise in employment which, however, is about 
half what was resulting from ICT R&D subsidies and with a less pronounced shift towards high 
skilled labour. In 2040, EU employment in scenario 6 is 73,400 full-time-equivalent persons higher 
than in the reference scenario, with medium skilled employment 49,200 full-time-equivalent 
persons higher, high skilled 24,700 full-time-equivalent persons higher and low skilled 500 full-
time-equivalent persons lower than in the reference scenario. This latter effect is due to a shift in 
the structural composition of the economy: R&D production is lower and growth in production of 
manufacturing goods is more heavily concentrated in ICT and services if ICT R&D public 
procurements is used as policy instrument.  
5.3  Varying the sources of financing: lump sum taxes vs income tax 
rates 
Above, in our examination of the impact of increased public expenditure on ICT R&D, we have 
assumed that the policy was financed by an increase in lump sum taxes paid by non-liquidity 
constrained households. This assumption allows us to examine the impact of increased ICT R&D 
public expenditures in a nearly neutral context. We now relax this assumption by letting the policy 
be fully financed by an increase in income taxes. All household types are subject to identical 
percentage point changes in their income tax rates. 
In the model, a rise to the income tax is assumed to reduce the labour supply which, in turn, changes relative 
prices and households´ disposable income. 31 Such an assumption, although rooted in theoretical and 
empirical literature, can nonetheless be challenged on the same grounds. This simulation should 
thus not be considered as a complete representation of the real world implications of policies. 
Rather, its value lies in portraying a "what if" situation, and in showing how policy outcome changes 
given different settings and assumptions in the model. 
A shift in financing from lump sum taxes to income tax rates only marginally affects ICT sector 
BERD.32 On the other hand, as portrayed in Figure 22, the stimulus to GDP growth is much smaller, 
driven by lower increases in domestic consumption and non-ICT investments, and a worsening of 
net export. The rise in income taxes also affects employment: assuming that the DAE spending 
target is fully reached using R&D subsidies, EU employment in the long term (2040) is 110,500 
full-time-equivalent persons lower if financed by income taxes (scenario 9) rather than lump sum 
taxes (scenario 3). 
This is explained by a series of interactions, which start from the assumption that financing public 
ICT R&D expenditures through income taxes reduces labour supply, drive up wages and domestic 
prices. As a result, net exports worsen, households’ real disposable income and consumption rises 
less than if lump sum taxes is used. Non-ICT investments also rises less as a result of the declining 
economic activity. As a consequence long term GDP increases less when public funding is financed 
by income taxes than when the policy is funded by an increase in lump sum taxes paid by 
households.  
 
                                                        
31  In principle, a change in the income tax rate has two effects in opposite directions: a substitution effect and an 
income effect. An increase in the income tax rate reduces the after-tax income of an hour of labour. This reduces the 
relative price of leisure. As a consequence the household would substitute from other consumption towards leisure. 
Hence, the substitution effect makes the household to reduce its supply of labour.  On the other hand the income tax 
rate rise reduces the household’s net income from a constant number of hours worked. To maintain the same level of 
consumption the household would need to work more. The income effect makes the household to increase its labour 
supply. In the model the substitution effect is assumed to dominate the income effect. 
32  If ICT R&D subsidies are used as policy instrument, then funding by income taxes makes ICT sector BERD in the EU 
55 million € lower in 2020 (ICT sector BERD totals 39.6 billion €), and 30 million € lower in 2040 (it totals 
59.4 billion €). Aggregate ICT sector BERD in the EU is also slightly lower if ICT R&D public procurement is funded with 
income taxes. In this case EU ICT sector BERD is 86 million € lower (it totals 35.8 billion €) in 2020 and 121 million € 
lower (it totals 53.2 billion €) in 2040. Thus, crowding out of commercial  ICT sector BERD only marginally increases. 
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Figure 22: Changes in GDP, ICT R&D subsidies at varying types of funding sources 
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Figure 23 shows the change in GDP under the two alternative sources of financing for the policy 
scenarios in which ICT R&D public procurement is used as policy instrument. In this case, the 
distortionary effects from higher income taxes outweigh the positive impacts from ICT R&D public 
procurement. Hence, GDP becomes lower than in the reference scenario. For example, EU GDP in 
2040 is 0.10 percentage points lower than the reference scenario if a doubling of public ICT R&D 
expenditures is financed by income taxes (scenario 12).33  
Employment becomes lower than in the reference scenario as a result of the reduced labour 
supply. For example, in scenario 12 in which ICT R&D public expenditure doubles, EU employment in 
2020 is 103,800 full-time-equivalent persons lower than in the reference scenario, and 180,200 
full-time-equivalent persons lower in 2040.  
Our results suggest that the impact of increased public expenditures on ICT R&D is sensitive to how 
the policy is financed. For example, the policy outcome of financing by income taxes depends on 
how strongly labour supply responds to higher income taxes in the model. This depends on 
assumptions concerning the income and substation effects. The determination of the size of these 
effects should be done empirically; estimates in the literature of the two effects vary with no clear 
consensus, although most studies find that the substitution effect tends to dominate the income 
effect. However, it is worth reminding that at this stage our results should be considered as "what 
if" outputs only, as changing model assumptions concerning labour supply could affect our 
conclusions.  
  
                                                        
33  That the economic impact of public procurement can change substantially if funded by distortionary taxes has earlier 
been pointed out by Baxter and King (1993), In a study on a model calibrated to match the US economy, they found 
that the government multiplier is positive when public purchases is finances by lump sum taxes, but negative when 
financed by general income taxes. 
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Figure 23: Changes in GDP, public procurement at varying types of funding sources 
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6.  Summary and conclusions 
This report outlines the results of a model-based simulation of the economic impacts of increased 
public spending on ICT R&D by EU Member States, following the objectives of the Digital Agenda 
for Europe (DAE). The simulation was performed by means of a macroeconomic model belonging to 
the family of dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGE) specifically developed for this 
purpose, with ICT and R&D-driven endogenous growth.34 The model developed distinguishes R&D 
by the ICT sector from that performed in other industries. It accommodates a range of policy 
instruments that may be used to stimulate ICT R&D activity in the economy and captures multiple 
channels through which R&D activity affects the economy. 
The model is used to simulate the economic impact of a set of policies. We consider different 
spending levels in the form of a full or partial achievement of DAE targets regarding public 
spending on ICT R&D, i.e. doubling its 2007 level in real terms by 2020. Different policy options are 
also considered with respect to the instruments used (subsidies vs. procurement) and to the way 
the additional expenditure is financed (lump sum taxes vs. income tax rates). The combination of 
the chosen policy specifications leads to the simulation of 12 different policy scenarios, whose 
outcomes are compared to a reference scenario in which no policy changes are introduced. 
In broad terms, the model suggests that increasing public expenditures on ICT R&D leads to an 
increase of BERD in the ICT sector, stimulates economic growth and raises employment: assuming 
that all Member States double public expenditures on ICT R&D, each additional euro spent would 
raise ICT sector BERD in the long term (2040) by as much as 1.6 euros if R&D subsidies are used 
as policy instruments. Each Euro spent would raise long-term GDP by 2.8 euros.35 EU employment 
in the long term (2040) would increase by 148,000 full-time-equivalent persons. A shift in the 
composition of employment towards high-skilled labour would also occur. 
In the model, marginal returns on public spending only slightly diminish (i.e. a partial achievement 
of the spending targets, say 75 % would result in a marginal impact per euro just above that of full 
achievement). This indicates that there are still substantial gains to be made from reaching the 
spending target, even from a position of partial achievement.  
The simulation results suggest that the level of expenditures chosen by Member States affects not 
only domestic growth and employment, but also the economy in other Member States. However, 
this crossborder effect is found to be small. For example, Germany benefits from a small rise in 
GDP in both the short term and the long term as a result of higher ICT R&D public spending in the 
other Member States. This suggests that increasing ICT R&D public expenditure across many EU 
Member States would generate small positive spill-overs. German employment is also affected by 
a change in ICT R&D public spending by all other EU Member States, especially with respect to the 
skills composition of employment. In contrast, a unilateral increase in public expenditures on ICT 
R&D by Germany would only marginally affect the economy of other EU Member States. 
The choice of the policy instrument and the source of financing also affect the policy outcome. In 
the model, public procurement of ICT R&D leads in the short term to higher GDP and employment 
than when ICT R&D subsidies are used, while in the long term (2040) these subsidies provide 
higher growth and a larger increase in employment.36 Similarly, due to the model’s assumptions, 
financing the policy by increasing income taxation reduces its long term benefits.37 
                                                        
34  R&D output contributes to a common pool of intangible knowledge capital available to firms across sectors and 
countries. This improves productivity of R&D production. R&D output is also sold as blueprints that provide the 
purchasing firm with the exclusive right to its use in production. Blueprints allow the production of new technologies 
and increase productivity. 
35  For Germany and France, each additional euro spent would lead to an increase of ICT sector BERD of 1.8 euros and an 
increase of GDP by 3.8 euros and 3.7 euros respectively in the long term. 
36  The difference is mainly caused by how the two policy instruments affect the various components of GDP. In the 
short run, ICT R&D public procurement leads to higher net exports, but also a more modest rise in domestic demand, 
than ICT R&D subsidies. In the long term, ICT R&D subsidies lead to higher productivity gains from the use of new ICT 
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These results should not be regarded as the complete representation of real world policy impacts, 
due to the fact that different assumptions with respect to elasticity of labour supply may lead to 
different outcomes. Instead, they suggest that the policy instrument chosen and related public 
finance decisions affect the economy in a complex way. The model provides a tool for examining 
these complex interactions. In a similar fashion, particular policies may be effective due to features 
not included in the model analysis. For example, the choice of procurement vs. subsidies may be 
affected if R&D projects are not provided commercially but are deemed to have positive societal 
externalities, or when their payoff is very uncertain.38  
All in all, the basic model deployed for this report represents a first step in the development of a 
tool for the macroeconomic assessment of public support to ICT R&D. As outlined above, the 
simulations performed suggest that an increase in public funding of ICT R&D may have a 
significantly positive impact on ICT sector BERD and on economic growth and employment, but that 
these effects could vary depending on policy choices. 
These preliminary results are promising. However, further work is needed to examine the sensitivity 
of results to model specifications and assumptions. In this respect, the analysis could be extended 
in several ways. Firstly, including more individual countries would allow the assessment of policy 
impacts at Member State level. Second, further work should explore the sensitivity of results to 
assumptions and parameter settings concerning labour supply, R&D spill-overs and trade 
elasticities. Finally, the effects of various policy instruments such as tax credits or subsidies 
targeted at R&D employment could also be usefully modelled. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
technologies than ICT R&D public procurements. This because, increased spending on ICT R&D public procurement 
leads to crowding out of private ICT sector R&D which slows down the introduction of new technologies.  
37
  A rise in income tax rates is assumed to slightly reduce labour supply. This drives up wages and domestic prices. As a 
result the net exports worsen. Households’ disposable income becomes lower, and this leads to lower private 
consumption. The distortionary effects from a rise in income tax, thus, reduce GDP growth and lead to a lower rise in 
employment. 
38
  Also, public procurement of ICT R&D may provide results from basic research that are widely applicable. In this case, 
spill-over to other R&D projects may be larger than those for commercial ICT R&D. In our model analysis, we 
assumed that the spill-overs from publicly procured ICT R&D are of the same magnitude as those for commercial ICT 
R&D. Further work on the effects of public procurement could modify this assumption. 
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